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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
LYDIA G. IVIE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Vs.

Case No.
8856

DENNIS WARING RICHARDSO·N,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case is before this court on appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County, Case No. 11 3 0 5 5. The
cause was tried, submitted to a jury and a verdict returned
for the plaintiff in the sum of $5,000.00. Defendant's
motion to set aside the verdict and enter judgment in accordance with defendant's motion for directed verdict
was denied.
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On June 9, 1956, plaintiff, a woman, purchased
groceries at a store located on the northwest corner of Jrd
South and 3rd East in Salt Lake City and then proceeded
to walk north on the sidewalk on the west side of 3rd East
Street with a child, her niece. She continued to walk
north until she reached a driveway area leading from the
main traveled portion of 3rd East Street westward over
the sidewalk and into a public garage. (R. 1) and (Ex. 1)
She stopped in front of the garage and observed the double
doors to the garage were open. She lived just across the
street (R.2) and knew cars frequently used this driving
area going into and out of the garage. She looked at the
open doorway and saw no cars at the threshhold of the
doorway, but did not look westward through the doorway
into the garage to see if any cars were approaching from
inside the garage. (R. 12, 13) She then turned eastward,
left the sidewalk and proceeded several steps forward on
the driveway with her back to the garage, (R. 3, R. 8)
intending to jaywalk across 3rd East Street on her way
to her home. ( R. 9, 10) As far as she recalls she did not
at any time look backward to see if an automobile was
approaching prior to the time she was bumped from the
rear by defendant's automobile (R. 14) which defendant
was slowly backing out of the garage. (R. 19).
Plaintiff testified there were available to her several
routes which she could have taken with equal convenience.
(R. 16, 17) Had she taken one of them she would not
have been injured. If she had walked on the curbed area
instead of the driveway area just a foot or two south of
the path she took, she would not have been hit. (R. 17)
She could have proceeded from the grocery store directly
east on a pedestrian crosswalk across 3rd East to the eastSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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side of the street and then north on the sidewalk to her
home and the route would have been no farther than the
one she attempted to take and this accident would not
have occurred. (R. 14)
The defendant, a young man, was outside the United
States at the time of the trial and a brief statement as to
what his testimony would be were he to testify was stipulated to at pretrial and read into the record and was as
follows:
((That he was backing out of his uncle's garage
at a speed less than 1 or 2 miles per hour and was
crossing the sidewalk. He checked to see if any
people were coming from either direction and then
proceeded to back out. Previous, he looked out
the rear window and saw no one. Just as he crossed
the sidewalk he heard a child start to cry and immediately stopped the car. When he got out he saw
a woman sitting down next to the car. The lady
was in the blind spot between the back window
and side window and he did not see her." ( R. 53,
R. 54)
Plaintiff was struck by the left rear bumper of the
car, knocking her down with her knee twisted under her.
She got up and proceeded to walk across the street to her
home. (R. 4) She had undergone an operation on her
knee in 1950 and had the kneecap removed (R. 5, R. 30)
and she was suffering some trouble with her knee from the
time of that operation up to the time of this accident.
(R. 7) The plaintiff's doctor diagnosed her injuries resulting from this accident as contusion of the sacrum,
sprain of the left knee and contusion of the left calf. (R.
30) The doctor believes that uan attempt should be made
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by an operative procedure to improve the function of
her knee." ( R. 32) She lost three days work as a result
of the accident. (R. 29, R. 30)

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS
A MATTER OF LAW.

A. Plaintiff was negligent per se because she violated
a Utah statute applicable to pedestrians and her violation
was a proximate cause of her injuries.
B. Plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout.
C. Plaintiff used a dangerous route when a safer
route was available to her and equally convenient.

POINT II
TWO OF THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL AND THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE
ONE OF THE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS WAS
ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY
NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A. Plaintiff was negligent per se because she violated
a Utab statute applicable to pedestria11,s and her violation
was a proxintate cause of her injury.
Plaintiff's conduct constituted negligence per se because in walking on the driveway at the place and in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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manner in which she was so walking she was violating Sec-

tions 41-6-79 and 41-6-82, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
((41-6-79. Pedestrian Shall Yield Right of Way
(a) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any
point other than within a marked crosswalk or
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection
shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the
roa dway. "
((41-6-82. Walking Along or Upon Roadways
-Standing in Roadway for Prohibited Purposes:
(a) Where sidewalks are provided, it shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon
an adjacent roadway."

The Court's instruction to the jury revealed that the
Court gave no credence to defendant's contention that
the driveway involved was not a private driveway, but
a part of the public street, a part of the roadway concerning which the traffic rules and regulations of the
Motor Vehicle Act of the State of Utah were applicable;
that the plaintiff was not about to ((jaywalk," but that
she was already jaywalking at the time of the accident.
The public street or highway includes sidewalks on
each side of the roadway and all the area between the
sidewalks. (Sec. 41-6-8 (d). U. C. A. 1953). The sidewalk is the part of the public street set aside for pedestrian
travel and all areas between the sidewalk which are ((designated or ordinarily used for vehicular travel" (Section
41-6-8 (c). U. C. A. 1953) are a part of the public ((roadway." Therefore, the place at which the plaintiff was
struck was part of the public roadway, and while there,
plaintiff was ( 1) committing a misdemeanor (Section 41-
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6-82 (a)); (2) was obligated to yield the right of way to a
vehicle traveling thereon (Section 41-6-79 (a)).

The following statutory definitions support the position of the defendant:
(a) Street or Highway. The entire width between the boundary lines of every way
publicly maintained when any part thereof is open
to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular
travel.
rr41-6-7

(b) Private Road or Driveway. Every way
or place in Private ownership (emphasis supplied)
and used for vehicular travel by the owner and
those having express or implied permission from the
owner, but not by other persons.
c:c

(( (c) Roadway. That portion of highway
improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular
travel, exclusive of the berm or shoulder.
(d) Sidewalk. That portion of a street
(emphasis supplied) betw~een the curb lines, or the
lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent
property lines intended for the use of pedestrians."
u

From the foregoing definitions, I think it is patent
that the plaintiff at the time she was struck was (I) on
part of the public roadway; (2) she was at that location
illegally; and ( 3) in that location she was obligated to
yiel~ +~e right of way to vehicular traffic.
I au not think the clear language of the statutes requires judicial interpretation to achieve the above conclusion. There are no Utah cases exactly in point coverit1g a perfectly analogous fact situation. The only case
in the books I have been able to :find, the facts of which
render it directly in point on this proposition, is a recent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Wisconsin case, Brunette v. Bierke, 72 N. W. (2) 702,
decided in November, 1955.
That case involves a fact situation which I think is almost identical with the situation in the case at bar, and as
to the motor vehicle statutes involved, one is the same in
substance as the Utah statute and the other is identical to
the Utah statute.
The Wisconsin case is an action for injuries sustained
by a pedestrian who was struck by an automobile backing
out of a service station. The trial judge rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and the plaintiff appealed.
The Supreme Court held that for right of way purposes,
a concrete ((apron" extending from sidewalk line to curb

line and constructed to provide convenient approach for
motorists to the service station constituted a part of the
highway, and the pedestrian owed the duty to yield to the
vehicle right of way over such apron. I have underlined
certain words above to emphasize the similarity between
the facts in that case and the facts in the case at bar.
On pages 704 and 705 of the opinion, the court stated
as follows:
uon the other hand, sec. 8 5.1 0 ( 21 ) provides

that (a highway is every way or place of whatever
nature open to the use of the public as a matter of
right for the purposes of vehicular travel', and sec.
85.44 ( 4) provides that (every pedestrian crossing a
highway at any other point than a marked or unmarked crosswalk shall yield the right of way to
vehicles upon the highway.' The apron was (open
to the use of the public as a matter of right for the
purposes of vehicular travel'; its very purpose was
to provide a convenient approach by motorists to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the service station. It was open to use by the Pl1blic cas a matter of right' because the right of the
public to use a street for p,urposes of travel extends
to the entire width of the street, to its whole surface, 25 Am. Jur. 461; Chase v. City of Oshkosh,
81 Wis. 313,51 N. W. 560, 15 L. R. A. 553. Peters
was not on a crosswalk when he was struck. Thus
by the provisions of sees. 85.10 {21) and 85.44(4)
the motorist, not the pedestrian, appears to be given the right of way.
2) The word (sidewalk' is ordinarily used
to designate a portion of a highway which has been
set apart for pedestrians as distinguished from that
which is used by vehicles, 2 Bouv. Law Diet.,
Rawle's Third Revision, p. 3068. Manifestly the
apron was not intended for use by pedestrians; an
adequate 5-foot strip of concrete was provided for
them. The apron was constructed to provide a
convenient approach for motorists to the service
station, to replace or as a substitute for an elevated
curb and boulevard which would constitute an obstacle to entry to the station. It was the obvious
intent of the legislature to grant to the pedestrian
the right of way at places at which they are usually found, upon sidewalks as that term is universally understood. We do not consider that it was
in tended by the legis! ature to extend the area in
which the rights of pedestrians over the motorist
are recognized. We can perceive no reason for so
doing. On the contrary, it would be absurd to
contend that the apron was constructed for any
purpose other than to accommodate the motorist. It
was con~tructed primarily, if not exclusively, for
his easy passage to the station. We must assume that
the legislature had these well-known facts in mind
when enacting the statutes and that they did not
intend that a pedestrian should be given more fau (
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vorable consideration than is to be given a motorist
when the pedestrian is found in a place where he
should not be, or where foot-travelers are not ordinarily found. We think therefor that for the purpose of determining who has the right of way, sec.
8 5.44 ( 5) must be construed as, granting to the
pedestrian the right of way over the motorist only
when he is upon that portion of the sidewalk which
is set apart for him, in this case the 5 -foot strip immediately adjacent to the service station property,
that the apron is to be considered as a part of the
highway as defined in sec. 85.10 (21), and that since
the jury might properly have found that Peters was
upon it when he was struck, it was his duty to yield
the right of way and that it was proper for the
trial court to instruct the jury as it did."
If a Utah Court interprets the motor vehicle statutory provisions involved as they were interpreted by the
Wisconsin Court (and I think such interpretation is compelled by the clear wording of the statutes), then I do not
see how a Utah Court could avoid reaching the same result in the case at bar as was reached by the Wisconsin
Court in the case before it.
If we take the point of view of the Wisconsin Court
and conclude that the motor vehicle law of Utah is applicable, in other words, that the plaintiff was at the time of
the accident located on part of the public roadway, then
certain declarations of the Utah Supreme Court become
strikingly pertinent.

Mingus v. Olsen, 201 P. (2) 495 (Utah, 1949) is a
case in point.
In that case a man and his wife started to cross: Thirteenth East in Salt Lake City near its intersection with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Westminster Avenue. They were proceeding in an unmarked crosswalk that extended over Thirteenth East.
The defendant's automobile struck the man and he was
killed. The court granted defendant's motion for directed
verdict uon the grounds that the evidence showed that, as
a matter of law, plaintiff's decedent was guilty of contributory negligence.''
The court said:

ccAs to whether or not decedent was within
the crosswalk at the time of the collision, there is
a conflict in the evidence. For purposes of this appeal, we must assume that deceased was in the crosswalk at the time he was struck. The crucial question is whether decedent failed to keep a proper
lookout for approaching traffic."
(That is certainly one of the crucial questions involved in
the case at bar) .
On the subject of lookout, the Court said on page 498:
.

uMore convincin.g than the direct testimony
that deceased did not look, is the further evidence
that deceased neither said nor did anything to indicate that he was at all aware of the danger presented
by defendant's approaching automobile. He seems
to have been wholly una"rare of its approach. Certainly he did nothing either to warn his wife, nor
to rescue either himself or her from their position
of peril. On this evidence, it must be said as a matter of law that deceased either failed to look, or
having looked, failed to see what he should have
seen.

4, 5) There can be no doubt that a pedestrian who undertakes to cross a busy street of a
large city, without first observing for vehicular
u (
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traffic is guilty of contributory negligence. And
this is true, even though he may be crossing in a
crosswalk, and have the right of way. In the recent case of Hickok v. Skinner, Utah, 19 0 P. 2d
514, this court held that a motorist who had the
right of way across an intersection, nevertheless had
a duty to observe for traffic as he proceeded across
the intersection. The rights of pedestrians to the

use of the public streets are the same as those of
motorists - neither greater nor less. Hence, the
same general duties devolve upon them. A pedesstrian crossing a public street in a crosswalk or petrian crossing a public street in a crosswalk or peway over vehicular traffic, nonetheless has the duty
to observe for such traffic. Clearly, decedent neglected that duty in this case. It follows that he
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Of
course we do not mean to imply that a mere glance
in the direction of the approaching automobile
would suffice. The duty to look has inherent in it
the duty to see what is there to be seen, and to pay
heed to it." (Emphasis supplied)
If it is true, as Justice Wolfe said in the Mingus case,
that the ((rights of pedestrians to the use of the public
streets are the same as those of motorists-neither greater
nor less," then the plaintiff in the case at bar was certainly
contributorily negligent. If it was negligence for the defendant Richardson to fail to keep a proper lookout for
the plaintiff (and the jury obviously decided it was), then
it was negligence on the part of the plaintiff to fail to keep
a proper lookout for the defendant's automobile. If we
assume the defendant was negligent, even though his testimony was that he did examine the area behind him through
the rear vision mirror, then certainly the plaintiff was
negligent when, according to her testimony, she does not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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recall maintaining any lookout whatsoever to her rear for
an approaching vehicle as she proceeded down the driveway.
I submit that even if the driveway involved were a
private driveway, under the fact circumstances appearing
from the plaintiff's own testimony in this case, the plaintiff was at least as negligent as the defendant, and therefore
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. When a
pedestrian is walking in an area which she knows is primarily designed and used for vehicular traffic, she certainly owes some duty to maintain a reasonable lookout,
and there can be no question but that her failure to maintain a lookout was a proximate cause of her injuries in
this case.

Smith v. Bennett, 265 P. (2) 401 (Utah, 1953) also
is a case in point. There also a pedestrian was struck while
crossing a public roadway. In this case, unlike the Mingus
case, and I submit similar to the case at bar, the plaintiff
was not in a marked or unmarked crosswalk. This is another case in which the defendant was awarded a directed
verdict on the grounds that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law. A particularly significant
statement of the court was this:
uBy attempting to cross the street in disregard of safety rules, she (plaintiff) was charged
with a bigh standard of care, (emphasis supplied)
the duty being commensurate with the perilous
circumstances. ''

.

In the case of San! v. Miller, 206 Pac. 2d 719 (Utah
1949) the court was concerned with a pedestrian who had
been injured while crossing a street at a place contrary to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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law. While doing so he failed to keep a proper lookout and
the court said:
((Having omitted to continue to watch, he
failed to exercise the degree of care required of a
pedestrian who leaves a place of safety and places
himself in a position of peril. A greater degree of
care is necessary upon the part of a pedestrian who
undertakes to cross a city street at a prohibited
place than is placed on one who uses a marked
crosswalk."
I submit that in the case before the court the plaintiff
left a place of safety, to-wit, a sidewalk and placed herself
in a position of peril, to-wit, in an area which was designed
for the use of vehicular traffic. She omitted to continue
to watch and, therefore, failed to exercise the degree of
care required of such a pedestrian. Furthermore, she
undertook to cross a city street at a prohibited place and
uA greater degree of care is necessary upon the part of a
pedestrian who undertakes to cross a city street at a prohibited place than is placed on one who uses a marked
crosswalk."
Later the court said:
((Because of the violation of the quoted ordinance and statute, appellant was on the street at a
prohibited place, and under these circumstances,
he was required to constantly observe the movement of traffic from the direction it should legally
travel."

B. Plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout.
Even if we do not rely on the statute discussed under
A, we can rely wholly on common law negligence. It is
the defendant's contention that the plaintiff in walking
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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along an area designed for vehicular traffic without ever
glancing back to see if an automobile was approaching was
negligent in that she failed to keep a proper lookout, indeed
any lookout whatsoever, for cars which she should.reasonably have anticipated might have been approaching from
the rear.
Even if the plaintiff had been walking on a private
driveway~ which was not part of a public road, she should
have, in the exercise of ordinary care, maintained a ~ore
vigilant lookout than she did in this instance. She would
be expected to foresee the possibility of approaching auto·
mobiles even on a private driveway, which driveway
primarily existed for the purpose of accommodating vehicular traffic.

C. Plaintiff used a dangerous route when a safer route
was available to her and equally convenient.
Plaintiff's testimony clearly reveals that to be a fact.
The negligence of such conduct is recognized in Anderson
vs. Mammoth Mining Co. 93 P. 190 (Utah 1907).
POINT II
TWO OF THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS
WERE ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL AND
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE ONE OF TIIE
DEFENDANT'S REQUES~D INSTRUCTIONS WAS
ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL.
The Court~s Instruction No. 4 was as follows:
ulf you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant failed to keep and maintain a proper lookout for the plaintiff in the driveSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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way where the accident occurred and that such
failure proximately resulted in the accident, then
your verdict must be in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant."
This instruction is obviously erroneous due to the
fact that it is a formula instruction directing ~he jury to
find a verdict for the plaintiff if the circumstances exist as
set forth in the instruction yet in the instruction there is
no provision made for the affect of contributory negligence. In other words, if the jury finds that the defendant was negligent then the jury is bound by that
instruction to render a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and
is not required, or indeed permitted, to give any consideration to contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
The same type of error is committed in Instruction
No. 10, which reads as follows:
((You are instructed that the law in force in
the State of Utah on the 9th day of June, 1956,
which relates to the operators of motor vehicles was
as follows:
((1. That the driver of a vehicle within a business or residential district emerging from any alley, driveway or building shall stop such vehicle
immediately prior to driving on to a sidewalk or
into the sidewalk area extending across any alleyway or private driveway and shall yield the right of
way to any pedestrian, as may be necessary, to avoid
collision, and upon entering the roadway shall yield
the right of way to all vehicles approaching on said
roadway.
u2. The driver of a vehicle shall not back the
same unless such movement can be made with reasonable safety and without interfering with other
traffic.
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uyou are instructed that if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
violated either one or both of the above provisions
then you are instructed that such violation would
amount to negligence upon his part and you are
further instructed that if you find that such violation was made and that the same was the proximate
cause of the happening of the incident in question
and the resulting injuries to the plaintiff then .and
in that event you would find the issues of negligence
and proximate cause in her favor and proceed to
assess such damages as you find by a preponderance
of the evidence she would be entitled to."
The part of Instruction No. 10 which defendant contends is erroneous is the last paragraph of the same. Again
the court has given a formula instruction in which he directs the jury to find that the defendant was negligent if
it believes that the defendant violated either one or both
of the statutes, and then directs the jury in that event to
proceed to assess damages against the defendant. The court
in that instruction makes no reference to or provision for
the affect of contributory negligence.
Instructions Nos. 4 and 10 are inconsistent with Instructions Nos. 4a and 5 and could result only in confusion
in the minds of the jurors and I submit that Instruction
No. 4a and Instruction No. 5 do not correct the errors contained in 4 and 10 and do not alleviate the prejudice resulting from those erroneous instructions.
The errors in the court's instructions are analogous to
those made by the court as discussed in the case of Mazzotta
v. Los Angeles CounfJ' and Sant Finkelstein, 153 Pac 2d
3 3 8 ( c·atiforni3 1944) . In that case the offensive instructions read as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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((If you find from the evidence that the defendant, Sam Finkelstein could have avoided this
accident by exercising ordinary care in using his
senses of sight and hearing to discover the presence
of the Los Angeles Railway bus and in preventing
his automobile from colliding with the bus, ~hen
you must find for the plaintiff, Jane Mazzotta, and
against the defendant, Sam Finkelstein."
Finding that instruction to be erroneous and prejudicial the court said:
((The instruction upon which Finkelstein substantially relies as justifying the action of the trial
court (in granting a new trial) required the jury,
under certain stated circumstances, to return averdict for Jane Mazzotta. It, therefore, includes a
formula and -rnay be justified only if it contains all
of the elements essential to a recovery (citing cases)
and the absence of any one of the necessary elements may not be compensated for or cured by the
fact that other instructions state the omitted factors required to sustain the verdict directed." (citing cases) (emphasis added) .
The error made by the court in the case at bar is
also analogous to the situation in Spear vs. Leuenberger, 112
Pac 2d 43 (Cal. 1941).
There the offensive instruction appearing on P. SO
was as follows:
((I further instruct you that if you find the
defendant neglected any duty, or duties imposed
upon him by law, or the duties imposed upon him to
be generally careful and prudent in the operation of
his automobile and that the accident could not have
been avoided by plaintiff even though plaintiff ha.d
observed all demands of law and good judgment
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because of the recklessness and carelessness of defendant, then you will find for the plaintiff."
Referring to the instructions the court said:
celt is contended that this instruction purported to state all of the conditions upon which
liability could be imposed upon the defendants;
that it did not contain the necessary element that
the defendants' negligence must have been the
proximate cause of the accident, and that contribu-

tory negligence on the part of the plaintiff proximately contributing to the accident would bar
recovery. Also, that the phrase (all demands of
law and good judgment' does not· mean contributory negligence and could not be taken by the jury
to have that meaning. We are of the opinion that
this instruction is subject to the criticism stated. It
has frequently been held that instructions of this

kind must correctly set forth all of the conditions
necessary, that the exclusion of any one necessary
element constitutes reversible error, and that even
a correct instruction in another part of the charge
of a matter omitted from the formula instruction
does not rectify the error." (Emphasis added)
Later in the opinion the court further stated at P. 52:

uwe are of the opinion that the rule to be followed herein is that set forth in the quite recent
case of Ferguson v. Nakahara, Cal. App., 110 P.
2d 1091, de.cided March 12, 1941, and wherein at
page 109 6 it is said: (All instructions of the court
are to be considered and construed as a whole to
determine whether they contain reversible error. If
a single instruction omits an essential element of the
cause, but is a correct declaration of the law so far
as it goes, and the omitted elemen.t is correctly given in another instruction, the omission will ordiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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If, however, an essential
principle of law is stated to the jury materially incorrect, this Prejudicial error will not ordinarily
be cured by a correct declaration of the same principle in another instruction. The· giving of instruc-

narily be cured thereby.

tions which are contradictory in essential elements
may warrant a reversal of a judgment, for the reason that it is impossible to determine which charge
controlled the determination of the jury.' Soda
v. Marriott, 118 Cal. App. 63 5, 5 P. 2d 675; see,
also, Akers v. Cowan, 26 Cal. App. 2d 694, 80 P. 2d
143.'' (Emphasis added)
The facts in the case of Williams v. Portland General
Electric Co. 247 Pac (2d) 494, (Oregon 1952) are not
analogous, but the pertinent principle with regard to instructions is set forth in that case in the following language
at P. 499:
((Misleading and inconsistent instructions are
frequently deemed ground for new trials or reversals." (citing cases) .
Later the court said:
uThe parties to any jury case are entitled to
have the jury instructed in the law which governs
the case in plain, clear, simple language. The objective of the mold, framework and language of the
instructions should be to enlighten and to acquaint
the jury with the applicable law. Everything
which is reasonably capable of confusing or misleading the jury should be avoided. Instructions
which mislead or confuse are ground for a reversal
. 1"
or a new trta.
The Pennsylvania court in the cases of Sears v. Birbeck,
321 Pa. 375, 383, 184 A. 6 ,10, and in Randolph v. Camp·bell, 62 A. 2d 60, uses this language in both cases:
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ult is a primary duty of the trial judge-a
duty that must never be ignored-in charging a
jury to clarify the issues so that the jury may comprehend the questions they are to decide. * * * A
trial judge's charges which are inadequate or not
clear, or which tend to mislead, are well recognized
grounds for reversal." (citing cases) .
Defendant also contends that the court committed
prejudicial error in failing to give defendant's requested
instruction which reads as follows:
((When a pedestrian is located on a roadway
which is open to the use of the public for purposes
of vehicular travel the pedestrian has the duty to
yield the right of way to automobiles traveling on
such roadway."
As indicated .earlier in this brief, it is defendant's contention that plaintiff was walking or standing on a portion
of the public roadway, rather than on a private driveway,
at the time she was struck and that, therefore, the motor
vehicle statutes quoted earlier in the brief were applicable
to her conduct. Reading the court's instructions as a whole
reveal that the theory upon which defendant relied in this
respect was never submitted to the jury. The jury had no
opportunity under the instructions of determining whether or not the plaintiff was located on a public roadway or
a private driveway at the time she was struck and accordingly had no opportunity to determine whether or not she
was negligent per se for violating the state statute.
It should be noted that in the original pretrial order
the driveway involved was referred to as a private driveway. However, immediately before trial on motion of the
defendant the word private was stricken from the pretrial order.
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The court's action in refusing to submit that issue to
the jury was erroneous and prejudicial.

CONCLUSIO·N
Based on defendant's ·Contention that plaintiff was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law the defendant
asks the court to reverse the trial court and order judgment
for the defendant. In the alternative, defendant, relying
on the erroneous and prejudicial instructions of the court
and the court's failureto give the requested instruction described, requests the court to set aside the verdict and order
a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY, & NEBEKER,
MARVIN J. BERTOCH,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant.
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